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On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
1. The Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 Au-
gust 2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context
of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) must be interpreted as meaning
that it is not binding on the Member States.
2. Articles 107 to 109 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding points 40 to
46 of the Banking Communication in so far as those points lay down a condition
of burden-sharing by shareholders and holders of subordinated rights as a pre-
requisite to the authorisation of State aid.
3. The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the right to
property must be interpreted as not precluding points 40 to 46 of the Banking
Communication in so far as those points lay down a condition of burden-sharing
by shareholders and holders of subordinated rights as a prerequisite to the
authorisation of State aid.
4. Articles 29, 34, 35 and 40 to 42 of Directive 2012/30/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination of safeguards
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in respect of
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and
alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent,
must be interpreted as not precluding points 40 to 46 of the Banking Communica-
tion in so far as those points lay down a condition of burden-sharing by share-
holders and holders of subordinated rights as a prerequisite to the authorisation
of State aid.
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5. The Banking Communication must be interpreted as meaning that the
measures for converting hybrid capital and subordinate debt or writing down
their principal, as provided for in point 44 of that communication, must not
exceed what is necessary to overcome the capital short-fall of the bank con-
cerned.
6. The seventh indent of Article 2 of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding
up of credit institutions must be interpreted as meaning that burden-sharing
measures such as those provided for in points 40 to 46 of the Banking Commu-
nication fall within the scope of the concept of ‘reorganisation measures’, within
the meaning of that provision of that directive.
I Introduction
On 19 July 2016, the CJEU decided the Kotnik case concerning State aid, EU soft
law, corporate law and insolvency law. The wide spectre of legal subjects touched
upon shows that the case is important not only for constitutional and State aid
law, but also for the research field on regulatory private law.1 It impacts banking
contracts throughout the EU. The importance of the case is underlined by the fact
that the CJEU decided the case in the Grand Chamber.
In short, the CJEU ruled that the Commission’s Banking Communication from
20132 is not binding on Member States. It considered the Banking Communica-
tion’s provisions on burden-sharing to comply with EU primary law including
State aid provisions, the right to property and the principle of protection of
legitimate expectations. The CJEU also found that the burden-sharing regime is
compatible with Directive 2012/30/EU which generally requires that a capital
alteration be decided by the general shareholder meeting. However, the burden-
sharing regime is limited by the principle of proportionality since it may not
exceed what is necessary to counter the capital shortfall. After a short outline of
the facts and legal background, this case note will address each of the CJEU’s
findings and discuss their implications for other areas of EU law.
1 Founded on H.-W. Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law – The
Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and
Regulation’ (2009) Yearbook of European Law 3; fundamental with regard to banking regulation
S. Grundmann, ‘The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and
Rulebook’ (2015) European Business Organization Law Review 357.
2 Herinafter referred to as Banking Communication.
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II Facts and Legal Background
As a result of the financial crisis, several Slovenian banks came close to the brink
of insolvency in 2013. In order to be able to recapitalise them in conformity with
EU law, Slovenia amended its Banking Act in order to fulfil the burden-sharing
criteria of the Banking Communication.3 On 17 December 2013, the Bank of
Slovenia ordered exceptional measures concerning five banks by recapitalising
two, rescuing one and winding up two of them.4 The day after, the Commission
authorised Slovenian State aid for those five banks.5 The Bank of Slovenia used
exceptional measures including the writing off of equity capital, hybrid capital
and subordinated debt.6 The latter two are financial instruments between shares
and ordinary debentures. In case of insolvency, holders of hybrid capital and
subordinated debt are paid after ordinary debt, but before equity capital.7 Enga-
ging in this increased amount of risk is rewarded by a higher rate of return.
Holders of such instruments felt the Banking Act violated their right to property
and legitimate expectations. Supported by the Slovenian Council of State and the
Slovenian Ombudsman, they therefore brought claims for review of constitution-
ality before the Slovenian Constitutional Court.8 In the light of the Banking Act’s
genesis and its purpose to transpose the Banking Communication into Slovenian
law, the Slovenian Constitutional Court needed to clarify if the Banking Commu-
nication was binding and if it complied with primary and secondary EU law.
Feeling limited in its powers to interpret EU law and excluded from ruling on its
validity, it referred for the first time ever to the CJEU asking for a preliminary
ruling.9
3 Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o bančništvu (ZBan-1L), Official Gazette of the
Republic of Slovenia, No 96/13; for a more detailed description of the legal background in
Slovenia A. Vlahek and M. Damjan, ‘European Commission’s Banking Communication: Question
of Validity in the Slovenian Banking Bail-in Puzzle’ (2016) European State Aid Law Quarterly 458,
459–461.






9 Ibid para 29;OJEC C 81/3, 9 March 2015.
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III Non-binding Character of the Banking
Communication and the CJEU’s Missing Answer
to Pressing Questions for EU Soft Law
The CJEU rules that the Commission’s Banking Communication is not binding for
Member States. Its reasoning is clear and formal. The CJEU states that the Commu-
nication is not intended to have any binding effect externally, but rather expresses
an act of self-limitation by the Commission.10 The Commission is given discretion
to authorise State aid as being compatible with the internal market according to
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU if the State aid remedies a serious disturbance in the
economy of a Member State. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Commis-
sion lawfully exercised this discretion partly by binding itself to certain standards
expressed in the new Banking Communication. According to the CJEU, it is bound
to permit State aid which complies with the Banking Communication.11 However,
the Commission still has discretion to grant State aid which does not comply with
the requirements of the Banking Communication.12 In this formal way, the CJEU
concludes that the Banking Communication is not binding onMember States.13
At first sight, this result is not surprising since the Communication was not
adopted as one of the binding measures of EU law enumerated in Article 288
TFEU. This view is confirmed by doctrinal reactions to Kotnik.14 However, the




13 Ibid para 44 et seq.
14 Vlahek and Damjan, n 4 above, 462; J. H. Binder, ‘Wirksamkeit der EU-Bankenmitteilung und
Auswirkungen auf nationales Recht; unionsweiteWirkungserstreckung für Abwicklungsmaßnah-
men nach autonomem Recht’ (2016) Wertpapier-Mitteilung Entscheidungsanmerkungen zum
Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht WuB 719; A. von Bonin andM. Olthoff, ‘Zulässigkeit der Bankenmittei-
lung und der Gläubigerbeteiligung bei der Rettung und Abwicklung von Banken’ (2016) Euro-
päische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 778, 780; I. Triantafyllakis, ‘Italienische Banken: Wenn
nicht alle Wege zum Bail-in führen’ (2016)Wertpapier-Mitteilungen Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und
Bankrecht 2248, 2251 et seq; V. Ferraro, ‘La risoluzione delle crisi bancarie e gli aiuti di Stato:
alcune riflessioni sui principi delineati dalla recente giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia
dell’Unione Europea’ (2016) Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 1591; A. J. Tapia
Hermida, ‘Ayudas de Estado a los bancos en el contexto de la crisis financiera’ (2016) XLI La Ley:
Unión Europea no 41, 17; J. Morel-Maroger, ‘Droit bancaire et financier international : Crise
bancaire – Restructuration des banques – Validité des mesures adoptées – Protection du système
bancaire – Conséquences sur les investisseurs et les déposants – Conformité au droit de l’Union
européenne’ (2016) Banque et Droit no 170, 6 December 2016.
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tional Court is aware of the formally non-binding character and thus asks with
respect to the legal effects actually produced if the Banking Communication is not
de facto binding.15 In fact, all actors, ie Member States and banks, feel de facto
bound by it because they do not want to take the risk of a restructuring failure if
the Commission does not approve the State aid. The CJEU rejects a gradual
approach to conceiving the binding character of legal norms by formally limiting
the Banking Communication’s effects to the Commission.
In his Opinion on Kotnik, Advocate General Nils Wahl explicitly addresses the
question of de facto binding character.16 In the light of the absence of legislative
powers of the Commission under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, he stresses that the
Commission would exceed its powers if it adopted binding general and abstract
rules.17 Advocate General Wahl therefore denies any de jure or de facto binding
character to the Commission’s guidelines even though he concedes that they
might have an ‘incidental or indirect’ effect on the Member States.18 He recognises
that it might be difficult for Member States to persuade the Commission to
exercise its discretion under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU outside the Banking Commu-
nication by granting State aid which does not comply with the burden-sharing
regime.19 He also admits that governments are likely not to take that risk if a major
bank is in financial distress.20 However, he declares this compliance to be a
merely factual question of expediency without true legal relevance.21 According to
him, aid can be compatible with the Treaties outside the Banking Communica-
tion’s burden-sharing regime, e.g. if the proposed solution is less costly than
burden-sharing measures for reasons of procedural obstacles.22
In a broader context, Kotnik is emblematic of the EU administrative law’s
recurring problem that soft law measures often express the lack of competences
for enacting hard law measures. Notwithstanding the lack of binding character,
the affected actors de facto abide by them, showing that they consider them to be
binding to a certain degree. This phenomenon is well known for guidelines of EU
15 Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij 19 July 2016 (CJEU)
para 30.
16 Opinion of AG Wahl, Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij,
delivered on 18 February 2016, para 32.
17 Ibid para 36 et seq.
18 Ibid para 40; interesting on this point A. Bouchagiar, ‘The Binding Effects of Guidelines on the
Compatibility of State Aid: How Hard is the Commission’s Soft Law?’ (2017) Journal of European
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agencies such as the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)23 ESMA, EBA and
EIOPA.24 There, the main reason for using soft law measures is the CJEU’s Meroni
doctrine which impedes the Commission from sub-delegating discretionary ex-
ecutive powers to agencies.25 Of course, Kotnik is different in that the Commission
has the power to adopt decisions in State aid questions with binding effect,26
whilst the ESAs do not have such power.27 However, the Banking Communication
also concerns the legal core of the Commission’s exercise of discretion and the
need for leeway where the Treaties provide it with discretion. Hence, the Banking
Communication and the ESA’s guidelines or technical standards are comparable
in so far as they express the Commission’s limited ability to restrict its discretion-
ary powers. The denial of binding character to those measures is due to the
imperfection of EU primary law. This should not dispense us from rethinking the
concept of binding character in a more gradual way though.
Problems arise especially with regard to remedies against such measures
because neither national nor EU law remedies are sufficient so that a complicated
combination of both is necessary.28 Denying any binding legal effect of the Bank-
ing Communication means that neither EU law nor the jurisdiction of the CJEU as
a consequence reign fully in these difficult restructuring questions concerning
State aid. The same goes for guidelines issued by the ESAs.29 On the one hand,
this regulatory vacuum will be filled by national legislators and national courts.
Since the binding measures implementing the burden-sharing regime will be
imposed on a national level, actors will always have to seek national remedies.
This leads to a retreat of EU law in matters quite crucial to it. On the other hand,
questions of interpretation regarding the Banking Communication or other EU
23 The three ESAs are the European Securities andMarketsAuthority (ESMA), the EuropeanBank-
ing Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).
24 On the possible binding character of EBA guidelines S. Cappiello, ‘The EBA and the Banking
Union’ (2015) European Business Organization Law Review 421, 429 et seq.
25 Case 9/56Meroni vHigh Authority [1957-58] ECR 133 (CJEU).
26 Art 107(3), 108(1) TFEU.
27 Eg for EBA: art 17–19 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC;
the same goes for ESMA and EIOPA in the parallel Regulations establishing them: Regulation (EU)
No 1095/2010 (ESMA) and Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 (EIOPA).
28 With regard to ECB measures in the Single Supervisory Mechanism H. Berger, ‘Rechtsanwen-
dung durch die EZB im Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – Teil II’ (2016)Wertpapiermitteilun-
gen Zeitschrift fürWirtschafts- und Bankrecht 2361, 2367 et seq.
29 This question has been raised for ESMA guidelines by T. Tridimas, ‘Financial supervision and
agency power: reflections on ESMA’, in N. Shuibhne and L. Gormley, From Single Market to
Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 55, 71.
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soft law acts can be referred to the CJEU even though they are non-binding.30 This
fragmentation of remedies for the same case represents an unhappy consequence
of the lacking binding character of the Banking Communication due to primary
law imperfection. A treaty change would be recommended for reasons of practi-
cality. That said, the happy side for Member States and banks is that they can
always try to persuade the Commission to exercise its discretion and that their
particular case is compatible with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
IV Compatibility of Burden-sharing with State Aid,
Principle of Legitimate Expectations, Right to
Property and Principle of Proportionality
The CJEU rules that the Banking Communication’s burden-sharing requirements
are compatible with EU primary law, particularly with the State aid provisions,
the principle of legitimate expectations, the right to property and the principle of
proportionality.
As to the State aid provisions, the CJEU first adopts the Commission’s stance
that State aid for banks can be necessary to remedy serious disturbances in the
economy of Member States pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, especially in a
financial crisis and in light of the spill-over effects to the whole economy.31 The
CJEU approves the Commission’s use of its competence by accepting the criterion
of burden-sharing measures as a suitable restriction of State aid because it pre-
vents distortion of competition andmoral hazard.32 Instead of leaving the material
question to the Commission’s discretion, the CJEU goes further and strengthens the
Commission’s argument by inferring the burden-sharing requirement from general
EU primary law. Thus, preventing distortions of competition and preventingmoral
hazard are lifted to the rank of EU constitutional reasons and burden-sharing is
considered to be necessary for the internalmarket integrity.
The principle of legitimate expectations was the pillar on which the claimants
argued that the Banking Communication should not apply to a case which was
notified before the Banking Communication’s entry into force but only decided
30 An exemplary case of reference for interpretation with respect to a non-binding Commission
recommendation is Case 322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles [1989]
ECR 4407 (CJEU).
31 Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij 19 July 2016 (CJEU)
para 49 et seq.
32 Ibid para 56 et seq.
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afterwards. The CJEU holds that the principle does not protect the shareholders
and subordinated creditors affected by the burden-sharing measures because
they did not have legitimate expectations. The principle requires precise, uncon-
ditional and consistent assurances.33 In areas where EU institutions enjoy discre-
tion such as State aid for banks, however, there cannot be a legitimate expecta-
tion that an EU institution will exercise its discretion in the same way in the future
according to the CJEU.34
The CJEU also denies a violation of the right to property. On the one hand, the
CJEU points to the fact that Banking Communication does not require any specific
measure to implement the burden-sharing regime.35 On the other hand, it under-
lines that shareholders and subordinated creditors freely bear the risk of losing
the share’s or credit’s value be it by losing in case State aid is granted or be it by
losing in the case of bankruptcy.36 This is underlined by the fact that point 46 of
the Banking Communication applies the ‘no creditor worse off principle’, ie no
creditor is treated worse in the scenario where State aid is granted than they
would have been treated in insolvency proceedings.37
Facedwith the criticism of the lack of proportionality, the CJEU unsurprisingly
rules that the burden-sharingmeasures need to be implemented with regard to the
principle of proportionality.38 The question regarded point 44 of the Banking
Communication pursuant to which subordinated debt needs to be converted or
written down, in principle, before State aid is granted. The CJEU holds that sub-
ordinated rights only have to be converted or written down as far as it is necessary
to overcome the capital shortfall, thus reinforcing theprinciple of proportionality.
V Compatibility of Burden-sharing with Corporate
Law
The Banking Communication was not only challenged for violating primary EU
law, but also for being incompatible with secondary EU law, namely Articles 29,
33 Ibid para 62; Case 537/08 P Kahla Thüringen Porzellan v Commission [2010] ECR I-12917 (CJEU)
para 63; Case 630/11 P to 633/11 PHGA andOthers v Commission 13 June 2013 (CJEU) para 132.
34 Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij 19 July 2016 (CJEU)
para 66.
35 Ibid para 72.




30, 34, 35 and 40 to 42 of Directive 2012/30. These provisions require a decision by
the general meeting of the company in order to allow for a capital increase or
reduction. The claimants criticised that the Banking Communication does not
require burden-sharing measures to be approved by the general meeting. The
CJEU’s answer is twofold. First, it points to the fact that the Banking Communica-
tion is indifferent to the measure’s nature and to its legal procedures. Second, the
CJEU holds that the Directive 2012/30 only aims at internal market harmonisation
for shareholders’ protection in the normal course of business.39 Thus, it does not
preclude crisis measures – eg under the Banking Communication – which are
adopted without the general meeting’s consent.40
In the same spirit, the CJEU rules that burden-sharing measures adopted
according to the Banking Communication are ‘reorganisation measures’ in the
meaning of the seventh indent of Article 2 of Directive 2001/24.
VI Consequences for EU Banking Contracts
Kotnik has a great impact on EU banking law. Since the Banking Communica-
tion of 2013, the EU architecture of bank resolution has rapidly evolved. In
particular, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive41 (BRRD) has introduced
new resolution measures both impacting State aid law42 and modifying national
contract and insolvency law.43 For the Euro area, this was underpinned by the
institutional framework of the Single Resolution Mechanism as part of the Bank-
ing Union.44 Since the BRRD contains the same spirit of modern resolution as
the Banking Communication and takes over some of its elements by rendering
39 Ibid para 87.
40 Ibid para 89.
41 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establish-
ing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and
amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EUand 2013/36/EU, andRegulations (EU)No 1093/
2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council.
42 K. Lanoo, ‘Bank State Aid under BRRD and SRM’ (2014) European State Aid LawQuarterly 630.
43 J. H. Binder, ‘The position of Creditors under the BRRD’, in Bank of Greece’s Center for Culture,
Research and Documentation (ed), Commemorative Volume in memory of Professor Dr Leonidas
Georgakopoulos (Athens: Bank of Greece, 2016) 37.
44 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and
certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Reso-
lution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
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them binding, Kotnik has an impact on the BRRD. Against the temporary
solution of bailing out banks with taxpayers’ money during the financial crisis,
both the Communication and the BRRD change paradigms by holding bank
shareholders and subordinated creditors partially accountable for the bank’s
capital shortfalls.45 The BRRD furthermore conveys stronger powers to resolution
authorities,46 renders early intervention mechanisms strong47 and introduces
resolution planning requirements48 and bail-in mechanisms.49
In Kotnik, the CJEU gives hints that it approves of this new approach to
resolution. First, the CJEU approves the principle of burden-sharing not only to be
a valid criterion for State aid decisions under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, but also to
be necessary for conformity with EU law because it avoids disruptions of competi-
tion and moral hazard.50 This elevation of the burden-sharing measures to the
level of constitutional State aid lawmeans that also the BRRD burden-sharing and
bail-in measures will be approved of by the CJEU in principle. It is interesting that
the CJEU recurs to the fundamental principle of market distortion avoidance.
Thus, it returns to the principles of State aid law from before the crisis where State
aid for bank rescues was set as ultima ratio. This element clearly shows that the
CJEU agrees with the Commission on trying to terminate the emergency reaction51
and coming back to business as usual. It is also striking that the CJEU places the
behavioural incentives of burden-sharing to reduce moral hazard as a pillar of the
internal market integrity. This means that the CJEU is open to incentive-based
differentiation between different creditors who are held accountable via bail-in
mechanisms under the BRRD.52 It is also to be expected that the CJEU will, just
45 Point 23 Banking Communication; Recitals 1, 5, 31, 67 BRRD; a good overview of the genesis of
both the Banking Communication and the BRRD is provided by S. Lucchini, J. Moscianese, I. de
Angelis and F. Benedetto, ‘State Aid and the Banking System in the Financial Crisis: From Bail-
out to Bail-in’ (2017) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 88.
46 Art 63, 37–42 BRRD.
47 Art 63, 27–35 BRRD.
48 Art 10–14 BRRD.
49 Art 43–62 BRRD.
50 Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij 19 July 2016 (CJEU)
para 57–58.
51 Praising AGWahl’s Opinion for a new approach to emergency law, even though for restricting
the Commission’s competence in emergency bank rescue P. M. Rodriguez, ‘A Missing Piece of
European Emergency Law: Legal Certainty and Individuals’ Expectations in the EU Response to
the Crisis’ (2016) European Constitutional Law Review 265, 272.
52 The incentive-based approach of the bail-in mechanism is expressed by the legislator in
Recital 67 BRRD.
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like in Kotnik, find the BRRD bail-in in principle not to infringe the fundamental
right to property of subordinated creditors and shareholders.
Second, the CJEU explicitly refers to the BRRD in Kotnik in two occasions by
ruling that the harmonisations brought by the BRRD have no limiting effect retro-
actively, but rather leave regulatory leeway to the Commission and its Banking
Communication.53 This parallel conceptualisation of the Banking Communication
and its burden-sharing measures shows that the CJEU conceives of the BRRD and
the Banking Communication as a harmonious evolution of banking resolution
lawfully prioritising bail-in and strong regulatory action. The CJEU does not
follow the argument that a later strengthening of rules means that the general
clauses were to be interpreted in a broader sense before.54 With regard to the
BRRD, it is to be expected that the CJEU considers its burden-sharing regime to be
inherent in EU law even before its concretisation. Cases dating back before the
Banking Communication had better not be brought relying on the prior regime.
For the future, this might imply that the CJEU will also approve of further
strengthening of the BRRD burden-sharing regime. That said, this regards only
the fundamental question of general primary law compatibility. The tricky ques-
tions lying in the details of the bail-in mechanism have not been answered yet
and will be adjudicated only once the mechanism has been used. The resolution
of Banco Popular Español S.A. on 7 June 2017 is to be considered a starting point
since it is the first resolution under the BRRD.
Against this background, cases challenging the BRRD, SRM and their resolu-
tion measures might force the CJEU to rule in a more differentiated manner on
bail-in and the burden-sharing mechanism in the future. From an academic point
of view unfortunately, the first three promising requests for preliminary rulings
on questions regarding the BRRD have been taken back.55 However, further cases
are to be expected.
53 Case 526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenij 19 July 2016 (CJEU)
para 93 and 112 et seq.
54 Ibid para 92 et seq, 111–113.
55 Case 394/16 FMS Wertmanagement AöR v Heta Asset Resolution AG, request for a preliminary
ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (OJEU C 419, 14. November 2016), case removed
from the register on 21 November 2016 (OJEU C 86/22, 20 March 2017); Case 309/16 Kärntner
Ausgleichszahlungs-Fonds v Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA), request for a preliminary ruling
from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (OJEU C 335, 12 September 2016), case removed from the
register on 18 January 2017 (OJEU C 129/14, 24 April 2017); Case 282/16 RMF Financial Holdings Sàrl
v Heta Asset Resolution AG, request for a preliminary ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien (OJEU
C 314, 29 August 2016), case removed from the register on 25 November 2016 (OJEU C 86/22,
20 March 2017).
Banking Communication and Burden-sharing 309
